The “framework agreement” between the Lebanese state and the Zionist regime is a document designed to alter the balance of power in Lebanon and consolidate Israel’s military gains. Rather than ensuring Lebanon’s security, this agreement has transformed Israel’s security into the primary priority of the Beirut government, while seriously jeopardizing Lebanon’s national sovereignty, the standing of the Resistance, and even the country’s internal cohesion.

Perhaps the most critical question is why Lebanon has arrived at such a point. The answer must be sought in a strategic miscalculation—one that took shape from the very outset of the negotiations. Instead of leveraging the capacity of the fourteen-point understanding between Iran and the United States to end the war, the Lebanese state sought to demonstrate that it could manage the war file independently of Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This approach represents a political attempt to distance itself from the Axis of Resistance and to prove the independence of the Lebanese state—an effort that has ultimately preserved neither independence nor security, but has instead produced a completely opposite outcome.

The Lebanese state assumed that by setting aside the role of the Resistance and entering directly into negotiations, it could secure greater concessions, but the result proved entirely different. The text of the agreement shows that nearly all of the Zionist regime’s core demands have been incorporated—from the disarmament of Hezbollah to the complete monopoly of arms by the state, the establishment of joint security mechanisms with U.S. backing, direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and even the groundwork for a permanent peace agreement and, ultimately, recognition of the occupation.

In effect, what Israel was unable to achieve over decades of war and aggression through military force, it is now pursuing through the guise of a political agreement. It suffices to consider Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks. Following this agreement, he explicitly declared that it is the result of the severe blows the Israeli army has inflicted on Hezbollah, and emphasized that the agreement will weaken Iran and Hezbollah while strengthening Israel. He even thanked the Lebanese state for its “courage” in accepting this process. Such language clearly indicates that Tel Aviv regards this agreement not as a compromise, but as a strategic victory.

More importantly, this agreement effectively legitimizes Israel’s occupation. Contrary to the claim of ending the war, the text does not guarantee the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory; rather, it conditions withdrawal on the full implementation of the disarmament process of the Resistance groups. In other words, Israel’s military presence will persist until Tel Aviv is satisfied with Lebanon’s full compliance with its obligations. This means that occupation has been transformed from an unlawful act into an instrument for exerting political and security pressure.

This very issue constitutes one of the agreement’s most dangerous consequences. Under international law, occupation is an illegal act, but when the continued presence of the occupier is accepted within the framework of a bilateral agreement, it effectively acquires a political legitimacy. This is precisely what Hezbollah has warned against. Sheikh Naim Qassem has described the agreement as “humiliating” and devoid of validity, stressing that linking Israel’s withdrawal to the disarmament of the Resistance crosses all red lines and will pave the way for a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon.

Yet perhaps more dangerous than the consolidation of occupation is the agreement’s domestic fallout. Israel no longer needs to directly engage Hezbollah in war, because the responsibility for disarming the Resistance has been delegated to the Lebanese army. In other words, the new agreement has placed upon the Lebanese state a mission that Israel was unable to accomplish for years. This is precisely the scenario that Israeli media have also acknowledged—that the Lebanese army will clash with Hezbollah while Israel merely watches.

Such a trajectory could plunge Lebanon into one of the most perilous periods of its contemporary history. The country’s experience has shown that whenever the rift among the state, the army, and the Resistance has escalated into a security confrontation, the ground for civil war has been laid. Now too, there is a risk that the political dispute over the resistance’s arms could devolve into military confrontation among Lebanese forces—a confrontation whose biggest beneficiary would be Israel.

On the other hand, the United States is not playing the role of a neutral mediator in this agreement; rather, it has become the principal actor in its implementation. Nearly all of the agreement’s provisions are tied to U.S. oversight, support, or guarantees—from security arrangements to Lebanon’s reconstruction, economic assistance, the formation of joint working groups, and even monitoring how financial resources are spent.

This extensive dependency also raises serious questions about the Lebanese state’s decision-making independence. A country that was supposed to prove its independence from the Axis of Resistance has now tied nearly all of its security and economic mechanisms to Washington. In effect, in distancing itself from one regional actor, the Lebanese state has rendered itself more dependent on an extra-regional one.

Another noteworthy point is the gradual evolution of the agreement’s language. The published text explicitly states that this framework could lead to a comprehensive peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel. This means that what begins today under the rubric of ending hostilities may tomorrow culminate in full normalization of relations with the Zionist regime—a path that a significant segment of Lebanese society has so far opposed.

From a strategic perspective, this agreement also sends a clear message to the region. If a country, after enduring military aggression, ultimately accepts the occupation of part of its territory, disarms its internal Resistance, and prioritizes the enemy’s security over its own, it will in effect establish a dangerous precedent for the future—a precedent in which military aggression can be converted into a political achievement.

The reality is that the Lebanese state has committed a fundamental miscalculation in its calculations. The Lebanese state assumed that distancing itself from the Resistance and independently entering negotiations would strengthen its position, but the result was precisely the opposite. Today, not only does Israel refer to this agreement as a historic victory, but the text itself also shows that nearly all of Tel Aviv’s strategic objectives—from weakening Hezbollah to reshaping Lebanon’s security structure—have been incorporated.

Lebanon could have chosen a different path—one grounded in halting the war, the unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces, and the preservation of a deterrent balance. But the state chose instead, with the aim of displaying political independence, to distance itself from the capacity of the prior understanding and pursue the path of direct negotiations. The result of this choice has been not the consolidation of national sovereignty, but rather the legitimization of the occupiers’ presence, the delegation of the Resistance’s disarmament to the Lebanese army, the expansion of U.S. influence over domestic decision-making, and the cultivation of conditions for a deep internal schism.

In the end, perhaps the most important lesson of this experience is that in foreign policy, emotional and symbolic decisions cannot substitute for strategic calculations. Independence is not defined merely by distancing oneself from an ally; independence acquires meaning when a state can defend its territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and the security of its people without accepting the demands of the aggressor. If the outcome of an agreement is that the occupier regards itself as victorious, the Resistance is weakened, the risk of civil war increases, and the path toward normalization with the enemy is paved, it is utterly absurd to call that an achievement for Lebanon.

DID