Donald Trump’s declaration of an unprecedented economic war against Iran cannot be seen merely as a sign of the start of new economic pressure. This decision shows, more than anything else, that Washington, after months of military and sanctions pressure, is facing the narrowing of its effective options. Instead of finding new and decisive targets inside Iran, the United States has now shifted the scope of pressure beyond Iran’s borders and is targeting countries, banks, and companies that still allow Tehran to trade and maintain financial access. In fact, Trump’s new policy can be seen as an attempt to compensate for the failure of previous pressure; a shift from direct pressure on Iran to pressure on the network that allows Iran to circumvent sanctions.
Over the past years, the United States has placed almost all major sectors of Iran’s economy on the sanctions list; from oil and petrochemicals to shipping, metals, the automotive industry, the Central Bank, financial networks, and various economic institutions. The Atlantic Council has also emphasized, in its review of sanctions on Iran, that almost all sectors of Iran’s economy have been targeted by US sanctions.
Therefore, Washington’s problem is no longer finding a sector of Iran’s economy that has not been sanctioned; the problem is that each new sanction, compared with previous sanctions, does not necessarily create new and decisive pressure.
This is why Trump now speaks of an unprecedented economic war, but the main arena of this war is no longer only Iran. The United States wants to pressure foreign banks, shipping companies, oil buyers, trade intermediaries, and even governments that cooperate with Tehran.
This policy shift must also be seen in the context of recent military developments. Washington has turned to intensified economic pressure at a time when military pressure has failed to achieve the political goals the United States expected. If military power alone could have forced Tehran to accept Washington’s demands, there would have been no need to declare a new “economic war.”
It can therefore be said that Trump’s new policy is a kind of change of playing field; the United States has not retreated from the military field to the economic field, but it is trying to complement insufficient military pressure with economic pressure.
In the view of Western experts, the problem is that Iran’s economy, over several decades of sanctions, has gradually developed mechanisms to cope with these pressures. Informal trade networks, oil sales, financial intermediaries, the use of local currencies, and cooperation with non-Western partners are part of these mechanisms.
The biggest challenge to the new US policy is China. According to data from the company Kpler, cited in a recent Al Jazeera report, more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2025 have gone to China. A significant portion of this oil also goes to small Chinese refineries, and payments are made through small banks, trading companies in Hong Kong, and settlement in yuan.
This creates a serious problem for Washington. Sanctioning an Iranian company is fundamentally different from sanctioning a major Chinese bank. In the first case, the main cost falls on Iran; but in the second case, the United States enters into direct confrontation with one of the world’s largest economies.
For this reason, as Bloomberg has reported, the United States has previously warned two major Chinese banks about the risk of secondary sanctions related to Iran, but has not yet sanctioned them directly.
Here one of the most important contradictions of Washington’s sanctions policy becomes apparent. The power of US sanctions stems largely from the dominance of the dollar and broad access to the US financial system. But the extensive use of this very tool has encouraged target countries to find alternative paths.
Chatham House analyses show that the expansion of sanctions has contributed to deepening cooperation among countries such as Iran, China, and Russia and has pushed them toward creating payment and settlement routes that are less dependent on the dollar.
This means sanctions may create pressure in the short term, but in the long term they increase the incentive of target countries to reduce their dependence on the US financial system.
As a result, the tool Washington uses to preserve its economic power can gradually increase the incentive to create rival tools.
The main problem with Trump’s new policy lies precisely here. The more the United States expands the scope of secondary sanctions, the greater the likelihood of colliding with the economic interests of major powers. Sanctioning buyers of Iranian oil can affect global oil supply and raise energy prices. Pressure on China can lead to a reaction from Beijing. Targeting foreign companies can also deepen the rift between the United States and its trading partners.
Washington therefore faces a difficult equation: to increase pressure on Iran, it must shift pressure onto other countries; but the larger this circle becomes, the higher the cost of implementing the policy for the United States itself.
The ultimate goal of US sanctions is not merely to reduce Iran’s income; the main goal is to change Tehran’s political behavior. But the experience of past years has shown that economic pressure does not necessarily lead to a change in political behavior. Iran can pay higher costs, change its trade routes, and expand economic cooperation with countries such as China and Russia. Even Chatham House has warned, in its examination of the consequences of sanctions, that broad pressure can help form parallel financial and trade networks; networks that ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the US sanctions tool. For this reason, the main question for Washington is no longer “what can be sanctioned against Iran?” but rather “how many other countries is the United States willing to enter into conflict with in order to close each of Iran’s economic routes?”
If we place Trump’s new policy alongside the military developments of recent months, a clearer picture emerges. After the experience of military pressure, the United States has now returned to sanctions; but this time almost all of Iran’s economy has already been sanctioned, and to find new targets, Washington is forced to go after Iran’s external network. This is the very point at which “maximum pressure” can turn into “costly pressure.” The United States can increase economic pressure, but it cannot expand it indefinitely without cost. China stands in the way of this policy, Russia has greater incentive to cooperate with Tehran, and Iran itself has gained considerable experience over the years of sanctions in creating alternative routes.
Ultimately, Trump’s new policy is less a sign of the discovery of a new economic weapon against Iran than a sign of the narrowing of Washington’s previous options. After military pressure failed to produce the expected result, the United States is now trying to continue the same pressure in the economic arena.
But this time there is one fundamental difference: the target is not only Iran. To isolate Tehran, the United States must also pressure China, financial networks outside the West, oil buyers, and international companies.
And this is precisely where the tables may turn; the sanctions that were supposed to isolate Iran can deepen Iran’s cooperation with the East, increase the use of non-dollar currencies, and reduce the dependence of some countries on the US financial system.
Under such conditions, Trump’s unprecedented economic war may be less the beginning of a new phase of pressure on Iran than a sign that US sanctions policy has reached the limits of its own power.
MNA